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ABSTRACT 
 This Article explores how international law works in spite of its 
fragmentation into radically different conceptions of law. Using the 
United States’ invasion of Iraq and Israel’s construction of a wall 
around Palestine, the Article shows how outcomes of a legal nature 
can be reached in spite of decision-makers’ different conceptions of 
international law. The Article uses two major conceptions of 
international law—positivism and policy-oriented jurisprudence—
to explain and address fragmentation. It demonstrates that the gap 
between the two conceptions of international law does not actually 
reflect meaningful conceptual disagreements. Instead, they are 
differences of normative commitments that are anterior to 
conceptualizing law. These pre-concept commitments relate to the 
purpose of law, the ideal type of law, and the importance of 
semantics. The Article makes three interlocking proposals to 
address the fragmentation of international legal theory. First, 
decision-makers should clarify what they designate by the word 
“law” so that they may engage each other meaningfully. Second, 
certain international institutions, such as tribunals, may partially 
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address pre-commitment conflicts because they have established 
hierarchies of conceptions of law. Third, outcomes will be reached 
through a process of claims and counterclaims about which 
conception should prevail. This Article concludes by testing its 
proposals against the United States’ invasion of Iraq and Israel’s 
construction of the wall.  
I. LAW IN TWO VIGNETTES  
One of the enduring puzzles in international law is how international 
outcomes are reached even though different decision-makers, such as 
judges on tribunals or foreign policy advisors, have varied conceptions of 
international law that require them to reach different decisions. This 
Article addresses the puzzle by examining two major conceptions of 
international law: positivism and policy-oriented jurisprudence.
1
 It makes 
a number of contributions to solving fragmentation. First, the Article 
corrects the misunderstanding that positivism and policy-oriented 
jurisprudence are in conflict over whether law is distinct from politics. In 
fact, both conceptualize law as separate from politics. Second, it explains 
that the conflict between the two conceptions of international law is more 
nuanced than some realize. Policy-oriented jurisprudence requires its 
adherents to account for policy considerations in their appraisals of 
legality. Hard positivism is in conflict because it excludes policy from law, 
albeit hard positivism may have limited explanatory power in international 
law. Soft positivism is less in conflict because it accommodates policy as a 
criterion for legality when a legal rule commands renvoi to policy. It only 
parts ways with policy-oriented jurisprudence when policy-oriented 
jurisprudence considers policy beyond what legal rules appear to mandate. 
Yet, this is not a meaningful conceptual disagreement. The disagreement 
instead arises from differing normative commitments anterior to 
conceptualizing, which this Article terms ―pre-concept commitments.‖ 
These pre-concept commitments relate to the purpose of law, the ideal 
type of law, and the value of semantics. Third, the Article suggests that 
 
 
 1. This Article uses the term ―conception‖ to refer to an iteration of the concept of law. See 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW‘S EMPIRE 70–72 (1986) (distinguishing between concepts and conceptions). 
It is worth noting that ―[w]hat conceptual analysis is, however, is not altogether clear.‖ Nicos 
Stavropoulos, Hart’s Semantics, in HART‘S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT 
OF LAW 59, 69 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001) [hereinafter HART‘S POSTSCRIPT]. For legal philosophers 
who disagree that the international legal theories discussed here are conceptions of law, ―conception‖ 
can be substituted with ―approach‖ without materially affecting this article‘s theses. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss1/2
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problems arising from the fragmentation of legal theory can be minimized 
when decision-makers clarify what they mean by ―law‖ and when 
international institutions apply hierarchies of conceptions. Ultimately, 
however, in problems where hierarchies are absent or not fully controlling, 
outcomes will tend to reflect a mix of conceptions of international law, the 
normative attractiveness of their respective prescriptions, and the power of 
decision-makers backing each conception of international law.  
The fragmentation of international legal theory is an age-old issue that 
has vexed jurists, philosophers, and decision-makers in international 
problems. Although this problem is not new, it is today magnified by 
broader and deeper international interactions that all require regulation, 
and which are not fully coordinated, in part because international law 
remains fragmented. For centuries, there have been diverse viewpoints on 
what international law is and how it works (and, relatedly, whether 
international law is even law and whether it works at all).
2
 However, the 
problem of fragmentation has now become acute, as different conceptions 
of international law have proliferated and some have become more 
entrenched.
3
 Without agreement on what international law is, who it binds, 
and how it controls actions, governments may reach different decisions 
about what is lawful. National courts and international tribunals may 
prescribe conflicting legal principles and inconsistent outcomes with 
potentially destructive consequences for world order. Corporations and 
individuals may be left uncertain about their legal protections in their 
international activities.  
Consider the invasion of Iraq. On November 8, 2002, the United 
Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1441.
4
 The operative 
 
 
 2. See HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: 
STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (1992); MARY ELLEN O‘CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT (2008); 
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, 
THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); JAMES R. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2006); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE 
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (rev. ed. 2005); HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d rev. ed. 1966); ABRAM CHAYES, THOMAS EHRLICH 
& ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY 
COURSE (1969); Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to 
International Law, 85 AM. J. INT‘L L. 613 (1991). For thorough discussions and comparisons of major 
theories of international law, see generally THE METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Steven R. Ratner 
& Anne-Marie Slaughter eds., 2004). 
 3. See Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AM. J. 
INT‘L L. 64, 64–65 and passim (2006) (discussing fragmentation of international law theory). 
 4. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/ 
Depts/unmovic/new/documents/resolutions/s-res-1441.pdf. The United States provided other 
justifications as well, but an extended debate on preemptive force is beyond the scope of this article. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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provision stated that the Security Council ―[d]ecides to convene 
immediately upon receipt of a [disarmament and inspection] report [on 
Iraq] . . . in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance 
with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international 
peace and security . . . .‖5 As it became clear that Saddam Hussein would 
breach Resolution 1441, the United States considered whether to 
preemptively invade Iraq. It had to decide if preemptive force was lawful. 
The Legal Adviser of the United States Department of State, William H. 
Taft IV, stated that his conception of international law was based ―not on 
abstract concepts, but on the particular events that gave rise to [state 
action].‖6 In the case of Iraq, the legality of preemption was partly 
contingent upon geopolitical factors that had grave policy implications, 
which included: ―the naked aggression by Iraq against its neighbors, its 
efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction, its record of having used 
such weapons, Security Council action under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter, and continuing Iraqi defiance of the Council‘s 
requirements.‖7 He concluded that ―preemptive force is certainly lawful‖ 
and is ―consistent with the resolutions of the Security Council.‖8 
Three permanent members of the Security Council, France, China, and 
Russia, embraced a different conception of international law that was more 
rule driven. In their view, the Security Council had issued an authoritative 
rule that only the Security Council could decide whether to invade Iraq. 
They issued the following statement:  
Resolution 1441 (2002) adopted today by the Security Council 
excludes any automaticity in the use of force . . . . In case of failure 
by Iraq to comply with its obligations, . . . [s]uch failure will be 
reported to the Security Council . . . . It will then be for the Security 
Council to take a position on the basis of that report.
9
 
The United Kingdom took a third position, which could be interpreted 
as a conception of law in which the content of rules are indeterminate and 
outcomes turn more on politics. On November 12, 2002, four days after 
 
 
For a discussion on preemptive force, see Tai-Heng Cheng and Eduardas Valaitis, Shaping an Obama 
Doctrine of Preemptive Force, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 737 (2009). 
 5. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 4, ¶ 12. 
 6. William H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM. 
J. INT‘L L. 557, 557 (2003). 
 7. Id. at 557–58. 
 8. Id. at 563. 
 9. Joint statement by the People’s Republic of China, France and the Russian Federation (Aug. 
11, 2002), available at http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Iraq-UNSCR-1441-Joint-statement-by.html. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss1/2
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Resolution 1441 was adopted, the UK Attorney General, Lord Peter 
Goldsmith, advised the UK Foreign Secretary: 
[I]t was very clear from Resolution 1441 that, in the event of Iraq‘s 
non-compliance, there would have to be a further discussion in the 
Security Council. . . . [O]nly the Security Council could decide on 
. . . whether all necessary means were authorised.
10
  
On March 17, 2003, Lord Goldsmith changed his mind. In response to 
a parliamentary question, he stated: 
Resolution 1441 would in terms have provided that a further 
decision of the Security Council to sanction force was required if 
that had been intended. Thus, all that resolution 1441 requires is 
reporting to and discussion by the Security Council of Iraq‘s 
failures, but not an express further decision to authorise force.
11
 
A confidential statement by the UK Foreign Secretary to Lord 
Goldsmith might partly explain the UK Attorney General‘s inconsistent 
interpretation of Resolution 1441. The Foreign Secretary asserted that ―if 
Iraq were to be found in breach of Resolution 1441, it was essential that 
we act pretty swiftly to take military action. . . . [T]his was of course 
primarily a military/political judgment.‖12 
On March 20, 2003, the United States commenced Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. It invaded Iraq. Key members of the Iraqi government, including 
Saddam Hussein, were arrested or killed. 
Divining conceptions of law from statements and events carries 
interpretative risk. Be that as it may, it appears that the permanent 
members of the Security Council may have adopted, or at least deployed 
rhetoric flowing from, different conceptions of international law. The chief 
lawyer for the State Department seemed to conceive of international law 
as a system in which the legality of preemptive force is determined in part 
by geopolitical context, and the ordinary meaning of words from a positive 
source alone (i.e., Resolution 1441) may not be dispositive. France, 
Russia, and China seemed to conceive of international law as a system of 
rules in which the express words of a positive source of law command 
 
 
 10. David Brummell, Iraq: Note of Telephone Conversation between the Foreign Secretary and 
the Attorney General on Tuesday, 12 November 2002 3 (declassified UK government document) (on 
file with author), available at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/43505/doc_2010_01_26_11_03_ 
33_493.pdf. 
 11. Lord Peter Goldsmith, Legal Basis for Use of Force Against Iraq (Mar. 17, 2003), available 
at http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3287 (responding to parliamentary questions). 
 12. Brummell, supra note 10, at 2. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
6 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:1 
 
 
 
 
obedience from international actors. The contradictory statements of the 
UK Attorney General, as well as the view of the UK Foreign Secretary, 
suggest a more critical conception of international law: a positive source 
may have indeterminate content, and politics controls outcomes. If these 
characterizations are reasonable, they present a theoretical puzzle of 
immense import. How were conflicts among different conceptions of 
international law resolved, and how was an outcome reached?  
Conflicts among international legal theories also play out in 
international tribunals. Consider the wall that Israel built around occupied 
Palestinian territory. On December 8, 2003, the U. N. General Assembly 
at a Tenth Emergency Special Session requested an advisory opinion from 
the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences of Israel‘s 
construction of the wall.
13
 The ICJ rendered its advisory opinion 
(hereinafter ―Wall Opinion‖) on July 9, 2004. Fourteen out of fifteen 
judges found that Israel had violated international law.
14
 Judge 
Buergenthal from the United States was the exception. The majority‘s 
opinion is rich in analysis and controversial at parts. For present purposes, 
it is sufficient to focus on the question of whether article 51 of the UN 
Charter, permitting a state to act in self-defense against armed attack, 
applied to Israel‘s construction of the wall. Article 51 states: ―Nothing in 
the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.‖15 The majority held that article 
51 did not make Israel‘s actions lawful. It reasoned: 
 Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an 
inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one 
State against another State. However, Israel does not claim that the 
attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State. 
 The Court also notes that Israel exercises control in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory and that, as Israel itself states, the threat which 
it regards as justifying the construction of the wall originates within, 
and not outside, that territory. . . . 
 
 
 13. G.A. Res. ES-10/14, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/14 (Dec. 8, 2003). 
 14. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 201–03, ¶ 163 (July 9), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ 
index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=5a&case=131&code=mwp&p3=4 [hereinafter Wall Opinion]. 
 15. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss1/2
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 Consequently, the Court concludes that article 51 of the Charter 
has no relevance in this case.
16
 
Judge Rosalyn Higgins voted with the majority, but wrote a separate 
opinion disagreeing on this point: 
While accepting, as I must, that this is to be regarded as a statement 
of the law as it now stands, I maintain all the reservations as to this 
proposition that I have expressed elsewhere (R. Higgins, Problems 
and Process: International Law and How We Use It, pp. 250–251). 
. . . Palestine cannot be sufficiently an international entity to be 
invited to these proceedings, and to benefit from humanitarian law, 
but not sufficiently an international entity for the prohibition of 
armed attack on others to be applicable. This is formalism of an 
unevenhanded sort.
17
 
She stated her criticism in Problems and Process in the following terms: 
[T]he Court appears to have selected criteria that are operationally 
unworkable. When a state has to decide whether it can repel 
incessant low-level irregular military activity, does it really have to 
decide whether that activity is the equivalent of an armed attack by 
a foreign army—and, anyway, is not any use of force by a foreign 
army entitled to be met by sufficient force to require it to 
withdraw?
18
 
In the decision, the majority of the judges of the International Court of 
Justice and Judge Higgins appear to adopt different conceptions of 
international law that led to different decisions. The court could be seen as 
adopting a positivist conception of international law, in which it 
mechanically interpreted article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It also 
follows, as Judge Higgins pointed out, the Nicaragua case, which limited 
article 51 to armed attacks by a foreign state.
19
 Judge Higgins, in contrast, 
has a policy-oriented conception of international law. She conceptualized 
international law as ―the whole process of competent persons making 
authoritative decisions in response to claims which various parties are 
pressing upon them, in respect of various views and interests.‖20 
 
 
 16. Wall Opinion, supra note 14, at 194, ¶ 139. 
 17. Id. at 215, ¶¶ 33–34 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). 
 18. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 
251 (1994). 
 19. Wall Opinion, supra note 14, at 215, ¶ 33 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). 
 20. 1 ROSALYN HIGGINS, THEMES AND THEORIES 20 (2009). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Accordingly, ―it is the task of the judge to decide the distribution as 
between them of values at stake, but taking into account not only the 
interests of the parties, but the interests of the world community as a 
whole.‖21 Her view of law as a process to distribute values may explain 
her rejection of the majority‘s decision on this point as unevenhanded 
formalism. 
This Article examines the fragmentation of international legal theory 
that manifests itself in grave international problems like the ones discussed 
above, and which may obscure the appropriate outcome mandated by law. 
This attempt to deepen our understanding of the nature of the 
philosophical differences between conceptions of international law is a 
useful contribution to scholarship because it begins to fill the interstices 
between international legal theory and conceptual jurisprudence. 
International law scholars are familiar with different conceptions of 
international law,
22
 but only a few international law scholars have 
appraised international law theory through the lens of jurisprudence.
23
 
There has been significant attention given to the fragmentation of 
international laws and of legal regimes (such as specialized tribunals).
24
 
However, the fragmentation of international legal theory, its practical 
implications, and the possibility of harmonization have been under-
theorized. Legal philosophers have discussed the concept of law, but many 
have not fully considered international law.
25
 There is much work to be 
done in the philosophy of international law.
26
  
 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. See O‘CONNELL, supra note 2, at 17–149; Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 3, at 64. 
 23. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD ORDER: THE 
TOWER AND THE ARENA 120 (2008); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function 
of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 345 (1998) [hereinafter 
Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance]. 
 24. See, e.g., Steven Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of 
Fragmented International Law, 102 AM. J. INT‘L L. 475 (2008); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Justice as 
Conflict Resolution: Proliferation, Fragmentation, and Decentralization of Dispute Settlement in 
International Trade, 27 U. PA. J. INT‘L ECON. L. 273, 314–20 (2006); Rep. of the Study Grp. of the 
Int‘l Law Comm‘n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law, 58th sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 11, 2006, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.682 (July 18, 2006); Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Cross-Judging: Tribunalization in a 
Fragmented but Interconnected Global Order, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 959 (2009). 
 25. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 238–45 (1980); DWORKIN, supra 
note 1, at 71 (not discussing international law); cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213–37 (2d 
ed. 1994). Although Hart considers international law at length, international law has continued to 
evolve since The Concept of Law was published. 
 26. Cf. Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance, supra note 23, at 368 (suggesting that further 
research should be done on the philosophy of compliance in international law). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss1/2
  
 
 
 
 
2011] MAKING INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 
 
 
 
 
This Article examines two leading and apparently diametrically 
opposed theories: positivism and policy-oriented jurisprudence. Positivism 
views law as a corpus of rules created largely by states and identified in 
accord with sources of law. Policy-oriented jurisprudence views law as a 
process of decision-making in which rules might play only one part in 
determining the outcomes in international problems. Normative 
legitimacy, measured against relevant global policies, also matters. An 
entry point into the fragmentation of international law vis-à-vis positivism 
and policy-oriented jurisprudence is the criticism that proponents of the 
former have made of the latter. Ever since policy-oriented jurisprudence 
was developed in the 1930s, positivists have criticized it for apparently 
―conflating law, political science and politics plain and simple . . . .‖27 Yet, 
policy-oriented lawyers have long participated in decision-making in 
international legal problems alongside positivists,
28
 confounding attempts 
at unifying international law behind one theoretical orientation. To reduce 
the fragmentation of international law, the positivist critique needs to be 
carefully examined and addressed. This Article unpacks what key 
positivist criticisms could be, whether they actually point to true conflicts 
between positivism and policy-oriented jurisprudence, and whether there 
may be solutions to these conflicts.  
Part II addresses a major false conflict between positivism and policy-
oriented jurisprudence about whether politics is a criterion for legality. 
Some scholars believe that positivism excludes politics, and policy-
oriented jurisprudence conflates law with politics. Part II demonstrates 
 
 
 27. Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights 
Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. INT‘L L. 302, 305 (1999); see Oscar 
Schachter, Panel Remarks, McDougal's Jurisprudence: Utility, Influence, Controversy (Apr. 26, 
1985), in 79 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 266, 267 (1985) [hereinafter McDougal‘s Jurisprudence: 
Utility, Influence, Controversy] (―Above all, the complaint charges that by subordinating law to 
policy, the McDougal approach virtually dissolves the restraints of rules and opens the way for 
partisan or subjective policies disguised as law.‖). Law and economics scholars tend also to adopt the 
positivist conception of law as a system of rules. See generally GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, 
pts. I & II; ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 
119–209 (2008) (leveling similar criticisms of the New Haven School). See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel 
P. Trachtman, The Law and Economics of Humanitarian Law Violations in Internal Conflict, 93 AM. J. 
INT‘L L. 394, 408 (1999) (criticizing the ―school‘s failure to distinguish clearly between law and 
politics,‖ and observing that ―many leading New Haven theorists have tended to merge law into 
policy.‖). 
 28. See Methanex Corp. v. United States (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 2005), http://www. 
state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf. Dame Rosalyn Higgins, the Former President of 
International Court of Justice, and Judge Florentino Feliciano, the Chairman of the Appellate Body of 
the World Trade Organization and President of the Philippines Supreme Court, were both schooled in 
policy-oriented jurisprudence. Policy-oriented jurisprudence has also been applied in national courts. 
See, e.g., United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1177–79 (9th Cir. 2000); Mortimer Off Shore Servs., 
Ltd. v. Germany, No. 05 Civ. 10669(GEL), 2007 WL 2822214, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2007). 
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that both conceptions exclude politics as a criterion for legality. It also 
addresses the claim that policy-oriented jurists have used their 
jurisprudence as a fig leaf for the political agendas of their states. It is 
impossible to examine every past application of policy-oriented 
jurisprudence to determine conclusively whether politics were injected 
into the mix. But even if it were possible, that would not conclusively 
establish that policy-oriented jurisprudence as a conceptual matter 
conflates law with politics. Just as positivists may apply politics to law in 
error without inserting politics into the positivist conception of law, 
policy-oriented jurists could apply politics to law in error without injecting 
politics into the policy-oriented conception of law.  
Part III addresses the conflict between positivism and policy-oriented 
jurisprudence about policy as a criterion for legality. This issue is more 
complex than some jurists think. There are some true conflicts and some 
false conflicts. Hard positivism excludes policy entirely from law, and is 
in conflict with policy-oriented jurisprudence. This Article explains why 
hard positivism does not accord with the semantic usage of the term 
international law, or, in the alternative, does not accord with a functional 
usage of the term.  
Soft positivism accepts that policy can be part of law. At this general 
level, it is not in conflict with policy-oriented jurisprudence. However, the 
two conceptions of international law are in conflict over the manner and 
extent that policy is incorporated into law. Soft positivists might charge 
that the policy-oriented conception gives excessive weight to policy, or is 
insufficiently determinate in its application of policy.  
A key intellectual task in policy-oriented jurisprudence is the 
clarification of standpoints. Undertaking this task brings into focus points 
of agreement and disagreement about whether the policy-oriented 
conception of law excessively or indeterminately incorporates policy into 
law. When the policy-oriented jurist serves as a judge, arbitrator, or 
counsel, in the normal case, his references to policy in identifying and 
applying the applicable laws go only as far as permitted by the same 
secondary legal rules that positivists apply, except in situations where the 
putative laws would lead to repugnant outcomes.  
When the policy-oriented jurist steps into the role of a legal scholar 
recommending alternative visions of what the law could be, he is less 
constrained in imagining the law. The scholarly application of the policy-
oriented conception of law appears incompatible with the positivist 
conception of law. Policy-oriented jurisprudence conceives of law as an 
authoritative and controlling process of decision-making to maximize 
human dignity. Legal rules do not matter solely because of their formal 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss1/2
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legal pedigree. It also matters whether they are accompanied by 
expectations of compliance, the extent to which they are in fact 
controlling, and whether their prescriptions promote world values. 
Conversely, practices without formal legal pedigree are relevant if they 
institutionalize expectations of compliance and accord with human 
dignity. In contrast, positivism conceives of law very differently. At the 
risk of being overly reductive, it conceives of law as a body of rules 
derived from secondary rules identifying formal legal sources.  
Part III suggests that although the policy-oriented and positivist 
conceptions of law are incompatible in this regard, this is not a meaningful 
conceptual disagreement because the disagreement arises from 
commitments that are anterior to conceptualizing law. These 
commitments, which this Article terms pre-concept commitments, are not 
of a conceptual nature. They are instead commitments that are normative 
in nature,
29
 and concern the purpose of law and the value of semantics. 
Because of their different pre-concept commitments, positivists and 
policy-oriented jurists have undertaken different intellectual tasks 
concerning different systems under their respective inquiries. Without 
agreement on pre-concept commitments, it is difficult to have meaningful 
conceptual disagreements.  
Part IV makes several interlocking recommendations to address this 
conflict of pre-concept commitments and tests its proposals against the 
International Court of Justice‘s Wall Opinion and the United States‘ 
invasion of Iraq. The first proposal is that decision-makers should clarify 
what they mean by the term ―law,‖ so they can, at a minimum, 
meaningfully agree and disagree with each other. With an adjustment of 
semantics, positivists and policy-oriented jurists should be able to choose 
either conception of law without causing confusion. They may even 
subsequently accept renvoi to the other conception if a situation requires. 
The second proposal is to resolve the conflict through institutional settings 
that have hierarchies of conceptions of law. The third proposal is to 
address the conflict through an international decision-making process in 
which claims and counterclaims about conceptions of law are exchanged 
until an equilibrium is achieved.  
 
 
 29. ―Normative‖ is used here in contrast to ―descriptive‖ or ―conceptual.‖ See Jeremy Waldron, 
Normative (or Ethical) Positivism, in HART‘S POSTSCRIPT 411, 411, supra note 1 (discussing 
meanings of ―normativity‖ and using normative in the same sense as it is used here). 
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II. LAW AND POLITICS  
Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell began working on the 
policy-oriented approach to law at Yale University over sixty years ago.
30
 
As the policy-oriented approach developed, observers conferred upon it 
the alternate appellation, ―the New Haven School,‖ in recognition of its 
geographical and intellectual locus and its worldwide epistemic 
community of adherents. The New Haven School conceives of law as a 
global process of authoritative and controlling decision-making to address 
international problems and to maximize human dignity.
31
 Normative 
concerns are explicitly considered and included in the criteria for legal 
validity.  
From its inception, the New Haven School has provoked strong 
responses from positivists.
32
 This may have been due in part to 
McDougal‘s iconoclastic persona.33 But it was also possibly due to 
perceptions that the New Haven conception of law was diametrically 
opposed to the positivist conception of law.
34
 Generally speaking, 
positivists conceive of law as a system of rules that regulate the conduct of 
those to whom the rules address.
35
 Ulrich Fastenrath has explained that 
 
 
 30. See generally Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public 
Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943). 
 31. See Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence & Human 
Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, 93 AM. J. INT‘L 
L. 316, 319 (1999) (―First, law is conceived of as an ongoing process of authoritative and controlling 
decision.‖). 
 32. See David J. Bederman, Appraising a Century of Scholarship in the American Journal of 
International Law, 100 AM. J. INT‘L L. 20, 41 (2006) (―So powerful was this new approach—and 
generally unprecedented and subversive—that it naturally started to draw sharp critiques.‖). 
 33. See W. Michael Reisman, Theory About Law: Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 108 YALE 
L.J. 935, 939 (1999) [hereinafter Reisman, Theory About Law] (―McDougal‘s image . . . in the 
collective mind of the academy and the profession [was that of an] enfant terrible and destroyer of the 
law . . . .‖). 
 34. See Harold Hongju Koh, Is There a “New” New Haven School of International Law?, 32 
YALE J. INT‘L L. 559, 561 (2007) (―The New Haven School expressly intended to criticize both legal 
formalism and legal positivism in international law.‖); Rosalyn Higgins, Diverging Anglo-American 
Attitudes to International Law: Introductory Statement, 2 GA. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. (SUPP. 2) 1 (1972) 
(recording Rosalyn Higgin‘s observations about skepticism of British scholars towards mixing policy 
with legal rules); Julien Cantegreil, Legal Formalism Meets Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence: A More 
European Approach to Frame the War on Terror, 60 ME. L. REV. 97, 99 (2008) (noting that the 
policy-oriented approach is ―diametrically opposed to the Kelsenian spirit‖). 
 35. See Simma & Paulus, supra note 27, at 304 (―Law is regarded as a unified system of rules 
. . . .‖); Ulrich Fastenrath, Relative Normativity in International Law, 4 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 305, 307 
(1993) (―Legal positivism identifies law with legal propositions (Rechtssätze), i.e. the wording of 
positive rules . . . .‖). 
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legal validity in positivism is determined by ―a law-creating process, 
without affecting normative content.‖36  
Because these two articulations of international law are radically 
different, some jurists believe that never the twain shall meet. Whereas 
positivists in general exclude politics as a criterion of legality, some jurists 
believe that New Haven jurisprudence conflates law with politics.
37
 Others 
have even gone so far as to charge that the New Haven School served 
United States foreign policy interests.
38
  
In the author‘s view, this is a false conflict because the charge that the 
New Haven conception of law confuses politics with law is conceptually 
inaccurate. The school does incorporate policy in the legal process, but 
explicitly distinguishes policy from politics. To explain this point, a 
somewhat lengthy exposition of the New Haven conception of law is 
necessary.
39
  
The New Haven School is principally interested in guiding decision-
makers about how to act in an international problem or situation. It is less 
interested in only identifying and applying rules that the world community 
might ordinarily term ―laws.‖40 Thus, the New Haven School conceives of 
law not just as a body of laws identified by reference to past decisions 
(whether judicial, legislative, or executive) that have been designated by a 
secondary rule of identification as a law. Law is instead conceived of as an 
authoritative and controlling process of decision-making to address 
problems and secure maximum human dignity. This formulation might 
seem inaccessible to lawyers unfamiliar with New Haven syntax and 
vocabulary,
41
 so each element is explained in turn below.  
 
 
 36. Id. at 307. Fastenrath‘s exposition seems a little simplistic, because it does not account for 
the soft positivist conception of law. See infra Part III. See generally, Benedict Kingsbury, Legal 
Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of Power and Lassa Oppenheim’s 
Positive International Law, 13 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 401 (2002) (explaining normative positivism).  
 37. See Simma & Paulus, supra note 27.  
 38. See Hari M. Osofsky, A Law and Geography Perspective on the New Haven School, 32 YALE 
J. INT‘L L. 421, 424 (2007) (―The School has been accused of . . . serving as apologists for U.S. foreign 
policy.‖); O‘CONNELL, supra note 2, at 70 (―The harsher criticism of the New Haven School was 
aimed at McDougal‘s evident promotion of United States policy.‖); Reisman, Theory About Law, 
supra note 33, at 939 (noting that critics have accused policy-oriented jurisprudence of promoting 
American values). 
 39. For other expositions of the New Haven conception of law, see JOHNSTON, supra note 23, at 
115–22; Cantegreil, supra note 34, at 99. 
 40. Eisuke Suzuki, The New Haven School of International Law: An Invitation to a Policy-
Oriented Jurisprudence, 1 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 30 (1974) (―[I]nternational law is most 
realistically observed, not as a mere rigid set of rules but as the whole process of authoritative decision 
in which patterns of authority and patterns of control are appropriately conjoined.‖). 
 41. See Burns H. Weston, McDougal’s Jurisprudence: Utility, Influence, Controversy, supra 
note 27, at 266 (noting that some audiences find New Haven vocabulary inaccessible). The author 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
14 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:1 
 
 
 
 
In its ordinary semantic usage, ―laws‖ often refers to rules, commands, 
or prescriptions that have been designated as ―legal‖ because they have 
been identified in the past in a court or legislature or executive decision. In 
the international context, a past decision includes accepted sources and 
secondary rules of identification, such as treaties.
42
  
To the New Haven scholar, however, the identification of a law 
according to predetermined secondary rules fails to provide adequate 
guidance to relevant actors about appropriate conduct. The actor will want 
to know how the rule is communicated, to whom, and with what effect. 
The actor will also want to know whether the rule reflects his interests and 
whether it is good policy. To the extent that the actor‘s interests deviate 
from good policies for the community at large, the New Haven scholar 
may take an external perspective and try to persuade the actor to set aside 
his parochial interests in favor of shared world values.
43
 Because 
identifying a rule as a law through past formal decisions alone could 
obscure the intellectual tasks described here, the New Haven School 
resists characterizing rules, standing alone, as law. 
An example might make this point clearer. The New Haven scholar 
would accept that the Genocide Convention contains rules prohibiting 
genocide,
44
 as defined under the Convention.
45
 But the New Haven scholar 
would not stop there in studying the international legal system. He would 
want to know how the Genocide Convention is communicated to potential 
and actual genocidal regimes and with what effect. He would want to 
know when and why genocide occurs and when it does not. He would 
study prior incidents in which genocide took place, genocide was 
prevented, or genocide was stopped. Based on the information he collects, 
the New Haven scholar would make recommendations to relevant actors, 
including state officials, courts, and non-governmental organizations. 
These recommendations are intended to coordinate their strategies in an 
authoritative and controlling fashion to prevent genocide from occurring, 
to stop it when it occurs, and to take remedial actions to ameliorate its 
consequences. The New Haven scholar is concerned with the entire 
 
 
intentionally describes the New Haven conceptualization prosaically in an effort to address this 
criticism. 
 42. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
1060; cf. ROSALYN HIGGINS, supra note 18, at 3 (―‗[R]ules‘ are just accumulated past decisions.‖). 
 43. For an excellent discussion of how legal advisors should, and in fact do, balance the interests 
of their government with broader ethical and policy concerns, see JOHNSTON, supra note 23, at 66–70. 
 44. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 
102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
 45. Id. art. II. 
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process in which relevant actors, such as states, officials, courts, non-
governmental organizations, international organizations, and corporations 
communicate past decisions to each other about the issue at hand; how 
they interact and address problems; and how good outcomes may be 
secured in the present and future. 
To count as law, as opposed to random or unlawful processes, the 
process of interaction must be authoritative and controlling. By 
―authority,‖ the New Haven School means ―expectations of 
appropriateness‖ at each stage of the process in which problems are 
addressed.
46
 These expectations come from a combination of factors. Each 
of these factors can be explained and illustrated with a hypothetical 
arbitration between two states concerning sovereignty over a disputed 
territory.
47
  
A first factor is whether the decision-maker has been properly endowed 
with decision-making power, such as an arbitrator selected by two states to 
resolve their dispute over whether a disputed territory should be restored 
to one or the other state.
48
  
A second factor is whether the decision-maker is pursuing proper 
objectives, such as the reduction of conflict, rather than unacceptable 
personal goals, such as the pursuit of bribes.
49
  
A third factor is whether the decision supports relevant world values. 
So, an arbitral award that purports to authorize a state to recapture the 
invaded territory through any means, including genocide, would be 
unlawful. This is because permitting genocide is bad policy, and strong 
international decisions have been made, in the form of the Genocide 
Convention and analogous jus cogens, to reject this policy.  
A fourth factor is whether the decision was made in a proper physical, 
temporal, and institutional context.
 50
 Continuing our arbitration example, 
this includes requirements that the arbitral award should be rendered after 
 
 
 46. Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, The World Constitutive 
Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253, 256 (1967). 
 47. Although this example is constructed hypothetically, Reisman has served as arbitrator and as 
counsel in at least two actual territorial disputes. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission Decision, 
http://www.un.org/NewLinks/eebcarbitration/EEBC-Decision.pdf; Case Concerning Land Reclamation 
by Singapore in and Around the Straits of Johor (Malay. v. Sing.), Request for Provisional Measures, 
ITLOS/PV.03/05 (Int‘l Trib. For the Law of the Sea, Sept. 27, 2003) Hearing Tr. 28:16–33:27. 
 48. See W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 739, 745 (1989). 
 49. See generally Jason N. Summerfield, The Corruption Defense in Investment Disputes: A 
Discussion of the Imbalance Between International Discourse and Arbitral Decisions, 6 TRANSNAT‘L 
DISP. MGMT. 1 (2009) (appraising corruption in arbitration from a New Haven perspective). 
 50. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 46, at 266. 
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a hearing, while the dispute is still alive and of a legal nature, and in 
accord with the rules of the arbitration center designed by the arbitration 
agreement. 
By ―controlling,‖ the New Haven School means decisions and 
processes that actually direct outcomes. Whereas ―authority‖ has 
normative and factual elements, ―control‖ is purely a question of fact. So, 
an arbitral award is controlling if it causes the disputing states to follow 
the decision, or to oppose it in ways that were contemplated in advance as 
acceptable and appropriate, such as by challenging enforcement in a 
national court, seeking annulment before a review committee, or settling 
the dispute.  
If law is a process of authoritative and controlling decisions, is a 
decision that is authoritative but not controlling still law? In the arbitration 
example, if the award is effectively ignored by the losing party, is it still 
law? The New Haven School would resist designating the award as not 
law simply because it is not controlling for a period of time. Few 
international processes are fully authoritative and fully controlling. Law is 
not a binary conception in which the process is most usefully designated 
as either lawful or not lawful.
51
 There can be shades of grey in an 
international process that addresses problems. Depending on how 
authoritative and controlling it is, it may be more or less like law. Because 
law is seen as the entire process of decision-making, the New Haven 
School would not necessarily characterize the ignored award as not law in 
the first instance. Instead, it would focus on whether and how the award 
could be implemented in the face of a losing party that seems, at least for 
the moment, intent on and able to ignore the award.  
If, however, the award were never complied with, and indeed a 
majority of the awards rendered under the arbitral institution are 
effectively ignored over a significant time period, the New Haven School 
might explain that although the arbitral institution and awards had the 
formal appearance of law, in substance they had ceased to function as law 
because of the utter lack of control. Over time, the awards may not even be 
authoritative in the sense that parties in arbitration may not have any 
expectation that the appropriate conduct is to comply with the award. If it 
became the situation that most arbitrations under the arbitral institution 
were reduced to kabuki, New Haven scholars might characterize the 
arbitration proceedings as a ―myth system‖ in which awards were rendered 
 
 
 51. Cf. Tai-Heng Cheng, The Central Case Approach to Human Rights: Its Universal 
Application and the Singapore Example, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL‘Y J. 257 (2004) (rejecting binary 
approach to human rights in favor of a central case approach). 
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and supposedly ―lawful‖ in the ordinary semantic usage of that word. This 
myth system would exist alongside an ―operational code‖ in which the 
world community understands that the award would be effectively 
ignored. From the functional New Haven perspective, an ignored award 
from an arbitral institution that is broken could not be considered law even 
if it is designated as such by formal sources.
52
  
An international decision that is controlling but not authoritative may 
also seem less like law. At the extreme, if a decision is made with such 
power that it controls outcomes, but is otherwise not authoritative, that 
decision may not be lawful. So a rogue state (or a powerful state—take 
your pick) that uses conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction 
unprovoked, or under an artificial fig leaf of self-defense, may well control 
at least one outcome: the destruction of the state attacked. But the act of 
aggression would not be lawful. From the New Haven perspective, the 
designation of the act as unlawful is insufficient. The New Haven scholar 
is interested in also making recommendations to relevant actors in the 
global community to respond in an appropriate process to restore world 
order.  
There is one more element of the New Haven conception of law that 
needs explanation. The ideas of authority and law are entwined with the 
goal to which the process of law is directed. The New Haven School has 
designated the promotion of human dignity to be the preeminent goal. The 
normative quality of law comes in part from the values it promotes. These 
values are designated in shorthand form by the phrase ―human dignity.‖ 
This capacious term includes values such as affection, respect, and well-
being.
53
 At its margins, scholars may debate whether a value is intrinsic to 
human dignity, such as an overly expansive or idiosyncratic notion of 
democracy. But there are clear instances in which an otherwise 
authoritative and controlling decision would not be law because the 
decision is abhorrent to human dignity. If an award purported to authorize 
a state to commit genocide as a self-help measure to reclaim its territory, 
the award would not be regarded as lawful. Its lawless nature would not be 
due only to the Genocide Convention and jus cogens prohibiting genocide. 
It would also be due to the self-evident policy against genocide. 
 
 
 52. See generally Michael Reisman, Myth System and Operational Code, 3 YALE STUD. WORLD 
PUB. ORD. 229 (1977). Reisman‘s separation of law into a myth system and operational code may be 
conceptually compatible with some forms of positivism, because it can be accommodated within a 
sophisticated rendering of the rule of recognition that allows the community to distinguish between 
rhetorical claims and actual prescriptions that are followed.  
 53. LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 375–590. 
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In summary, the New Haven School conceives of law not just as a 
static body of rules, but as an authoritative and controlling process through 
which social ends are constantly negotiated, adjusted, and secured.
54
 The 
New Haven conception is part descriptive, for it describes the international 
process involved in preventing and resolving international problems. It is 
part normative, for it identifies social goals to not only direct the process 
but also to serve as a heuristic for the legality of the process. It is also part 
prescriptive, because it makes recommendations to a wide range of 
decision-makers about appropriate actions and responses. But, perhaps 
ironically to some observers, it is not dogmatic. As an instrumentalist 
conception of law, it is open to making recommendations to decision-
makers to use whatever tools are necessary or legitimate to achieve the 
social goals. These tools include, but are not necessarily limited to, legal 
rules.  
Nothing in the foregoing exposition of the New Haven conception of 
law incorporates politics into the criteria for law. Yet, critics have 
contended that ―policy‖ functions as a code word for ―politics.‖55 
Perceptions that McDougal used the New Haven conception of law to 
advance American interests may have fueled this suspicion.
56
  
Space constraints here make it impossible to determine whether each of 
McDougal‘s interventions injected politics into law, or whether they 
simply reflected the promotion of universal human values.
57
 In any event, 
such an exercise would not get us very far in determining whether the New 
Haven conception of law conflates law with policy. Just as positivists may 
legitimately disagree with each other about the correct application of a rule 
to facts without necessarily indicating that the positivist conception of law 
conflates interests with rules, New Haven jurists may take controversial 
positions in an international problem without necessarily indicating that 
the New Haven conception of law folds law into politics. Even if in a 
particular problem a New Haven jurist incorporated law into politics, that 
 
 
 54. See Harold Hongju Koh, A World Transformed, 20 YALE J. INT‘L L. ix, xii–xiii (1995) 
(explaining that the New Haven School seeks to develop ―a functional critique of international law in 
terms of social ends . . . that shall conceive of the legal order as a process and not as a condition.‖ 
(quoting Roscoe Pound, Philosophical Theory and International Law, 1 BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIANA 73, 
89 (1932))).  
 55. See JOHNSTON, supra note 23, at 121 (attributing this view to Richard Falk). 
 56. See id. at 119 (―McDougal himself was seen as an unabashed advocate for US foreign policy 
. . . .‖); Edward McWhinney, Book Review, 87 AM. J. INT‘L L. 335, 338–39 (1993) (reviewing 
HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY (1992)). 
 57. See Reisman, Theory About Law, supra note 33, at 939 (noting Eisuke Suzuki‘s argument 
that the commitment to human dignity, which is core to New Haven jurisprudence, was a universal 
value, not an American value).  
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may simply be a misapplication of the New Haven conception of law, just 
as positivists may apply a wrong rule of law without undermining the 
conception of law itself. 
Any appraisal of the New Haven conception of law should not be 
transfixed on its applications to problems that occurred decades ago. In 
historical and contemporary applications, New Haven jurists have taken 
positions contrary to prevailing United States national policies or 
interests.
58
 Following the United States‘ invasion of Iraq in 2003, Reisman 
made the following critique of regime change: ―Let the strongest and best-
intentioned government contemplating or being pressed to undertake 
regime change remember that not everything noble is lawful; not 
everything noble and lawful is feasible; and not everything noble, lawful, 
and feasible is wise.‖59 In response to the Bush doctrine of preemptive 
force, Reisman warned that the Bush doctrine could pose a threat to world 
order, because it encouraged other states to claim similar preemptive 
rights.
60
 These appraisals contradict the claim that New Haven 
jurisprudence blindly promotes United States foreign policies.  
Further, the policy-oriented conception of law disavows not just biases 
towards United States interests, but the injection of politics into the New 
Haven conception of law. Consider the following passage written from the 
New Haven perspective: 
A . . . point of importance is the need to observe yourself as the 
instrument of observation and choice. . . . . [T]he responsible 
decisionmaker or appraiser should develop methods for scrutinizing 
the self-system and determining the extent to which emotional 
 
 
 58. See Rosalyn Higgins, The Benign First Mate, in LAW IN THE SERVICE OF HUMAN DIGNITY: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FLORENTINO FELICIANO 11 (Steve Charnovitz et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter 
FELICIANO] (―Feliciano‘s life in the law is a silent rebuttal to those who contend that a policy-oriented 
approach to law is but a façade for politics . . . .‖); Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Authority and 
International Investment Law, 20 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 465, 508–12 (2005) (criticizing the Loewen 
award for refusing to find jurisdiction over NAFTA dispute arising from lack of due process in 
Mississippi courts); Julien Cantegreil, The Final Award in Mondev International v. United States of 
America, in THE REASONS REQUIREMENT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: CRITICAL 
CASE STUDIES 33, 50–57 (W. Michael Reisman & Guillermo Aguilar Alverez eds., 2008) [hereinafter 
THE REASONS REQUIREMENT] (criticizing the Mondev Award for finding in favor of the United States 
based on inadequate reasoning). 
 59. W. Michael Reisman, Why Regime Change Is (Almost Always) A Bad Idea, 98 AM. J. INT‘L 
L. 516, 525 (2004). 
 60. See generally W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim 
of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT‘L L. 525 (2006). 
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tendencies, sub-group parochialisms or institutional biases are 
distorting or skewing observation and choice.
61
 
Thus, regardless of the allegation that some appliers of the New Haven 
jurisprudence might have injected politics into their appraisals (just as 
scholars and advocates using any conception of law may do so 
intentionally or inadvertently), the New Haven conception of law does not 
incorporate partisan politics as a criteria for legal validity.
62
 The 
perception that policy-oriented jurisprudence and positivism disagree 
about the incorporation of politics as a criterion for legality is thus a false 
conflict. 
III. LAW AND POLICY  
Another perceived conflict between positivism and New Haven 
jurisprudence is the apparent rejection of policy by the former and the 
explicit consideration of policy by the latter. This conflict is more complex 
than some observers understand. Whether or not there is a conflict 
depends on whether one adopts a hard or soft positivist conception of 
international law. This is at least partially a false conflict because soft 
positivists accept that legal validity can have normative or policy criteria. 
Hard positivists, however, contend that the conception of law cannot admit 
normative criteria for legal validity, which must be confined to social 
facts. Yet, if this is true, hard positivists are also in conflict with soft 
positivists on this point. In any event, the hard positivist conception of law 
does not accord with the ordinary understanding of the term international 
law and how it functions. 
A. Hard and Soft Positivism 
An excursus into positivism will help explain these points made above. 
It is perhaps an impossible task to adequately convey the sophistication of 
positivism here, but nonetheless an attempt will be made.  
Positivism as a legal philosophy provides the conceptual framework for 
positivism in international law. The key intellectual goal of positivism, 
 
 
 61. W. MICHAEL REISMAN & AARON M. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND 
SHAPING LAW 13 (1987) [hereinafter REISMAN & SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE]. 
 62. This does not mean, however, that New Haven jurisprudence ignores the geopolitical 
limitations when making proposals. See Robert D. Sloane, More Than What Courts Do: 
Jurisprudence, Decision and Dignity—In Brief Encounters and Global Affairs, 34 YALE J. INT‘L L. 
517, 524 (2009); Tai-Heng Cheng, Why New States Accept Old Obligations, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 41 
(describing and applying ―realistic normativity‖ of the New Haven school). 
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according to its preeminent philosophers, H.L.A. Hart and Hans Kelsen, is 
to describe the conception of law by reference to a central case or ideal 
type of legal system.
63
 This descriptive enterprise is ―morally neutral and 
has no justificatory aims.‖64 Hart‘s ideal type was domestic legal orders, in 
particular England. Kelsen‘s ideal types were positive laws from domestic 
legal orders, such as the United States or France, or, importantly for 
international law positivists, international law. Regardless of the legal 
system, Kelsen included within his field of inquiry only ―positive law.‖65 
At its core, positivism conceives of law as a body of rules identified as 
laws by reference to past decisions acknowledged as providing the rules 
with legal pedigree. Law is therefore a social fact.
66
 Kelsen conceptualized 
his ―pure theory of law‖ as a body of rules ultimately emanating from a 
Grundnorm, or basic validating norm, such as the very first constitution in 
a legal order.
67
 
For many Anglo-American legal philosophers, Hart developed an 
enduring version of positivism. According to Hart, a legal system exists if 
two social facts exist. First, officials accept secondary rules, the most 
important of which is a second rule of recognition, prescribing the validity 
of primary rules. Second, there is a general acceptance by the community, 
to whom rules are addressed, of primary rules identified as valid by 
secondary rules and the rule of recognition.
68
 The rule of recognition is a 
 
 
 63. See HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 25, at 239 (stating that The Concept of Law 
―seeks to give an explanatory and clarifying account of law as a complex social and political 
institution with a rule-governed (and in that sense ‗normative‘ aspect.)‖); id. at 100 (focusing on ―the 
salient features of a modern municipal legal system‖). 
 64. See id. at 240 (―My account is descriptive in that it is morally neutral and has no justificatory 
aims: it does not seek to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the forms and structures which 
appear in my general account of law . . . .‖); HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 
(A. Wedberg trans., 1945), reprinted in REISMAN & SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 61, at 
381 (1987) (―[T]he aim of this general theory of law is to enable the jurist concerned with a particular 
legal order . . . to understand and describe as exactly as possible his own positive law . . . .‖). Other 
positivists have since argued that positivism is not entirely free from normativity. See Waldron, supra 
note 29, at 411–12; John Finnis, H.L.A. Hart: A Twentieth-Century Oxford Political Philosopher: 
Reflections by a Former Student and Colleague, 54 AM. J. JURIS 161, 171 (2009) (―Hart‘s late-period 
work also shows the extent to which he was willing to admit, at least by implication, that the asserted 
autonomy of political from moral philosophy was unsustainable.‖). 
 65. KELSEN, supra note 64, at 382 (―[T]he pure theory of law seeks to attain its results 
exclusively by an analysis of positive law.‖). 
 66. In an earlier version of positivism, Austin stated: ―Laws proper or properly so called, are 
commands: laws which are not commands, are laws improper or improperly so called.‖ JOHN AUSTIN, 
THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 1–3, at vii (1832); but see HART, THE CONCEPT OF 
LAW, supra note 25, at 79 (criticizing Austin‘s conception of law for failing to distinguish law from 
orders issued at gunpoint).  
 67. See generally KELSEN, supra note 64. 
 68. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 25, at 100–23; see also Stephen Perry, Hart’s 
Methodological Positivism, in HART‘S POSTSCRIPT, supra note 29, at 319. 
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social rule or custom constituted by a regular pattern of conduct and by a 
―distinctive normative attitude‖ accepting the rule of recognition. This 
normative attitude is the rule of recognition‘s ―internal aspect.‖69  
After Ronald Dworkin launched a stinging attack on Hart‘s concept of 
law,
70
 Hart clarified in his postscript to The Concept of Law that he did not 
exclude from his conceptualization of law the possibility that a rule of 
recognition could, although it need not, prescribe moral or normative 
criteria (or, in New Haven speak, policy criteria) for the validity of 
primary rules.
71
 This version of positivism has become know as soft, or 
inclusive, positivism. Soft positivism contrasts against hard, or exclusive, 
positivism. Joseph Raz, perhaps the leading hard positivist, argues that a 
conceptualization of law cannot include policy or moral criteria for the 
validity of law, because that would undermine law‘s unique claim to 
authority and render it contingent upon morality.
72
  
Positivists in international law share some key postulates with their 
cousins in legal philosophy. The function of their conceptualization of law 
is to identify laws. Unlike New Haven jurists, positivists see their 
conceptual function as ―not to facilitate the decision maker‘s dilemma 
between law and politics (and, occasionally, between law and morals), but 
to clarify the legal side of things.‖73 Their ideal type of international law is 
the rules or norms governing international relations. Prosper Weil has 
asserted that ―the aggregate of the legal norms governing international 
relations‖ is ―an uncontroversial starting point.‖74  
Arising from their observation of this ideal type, Bruno Simma and 
Andreas L. Paulus have stated that all international law positivists are 
committed to the conceptualization of law in the following terms: ―Law is 
regarded as a unified system of rules that, according to most variants, 
emanate from state will. This system of rules is an ‗objective‘ reality and 
needs to be distinguished from law ‗as it should be.‘‖75 In the language of 
 
 
 69. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 25, at 56. 
 70. See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 45–46. 
 71. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 25, at 250–54; see Jules Coleman, Negative and 
Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982). 
 72. See generally JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 
(1979); see also Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference 
Thesis, in HART‘S POSTSCRIPT 99, supra note 29, 102; Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, 
and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis, in HART‘S POSTSCRIPT 355, supra note 29, 355 (both 
discussing hard and soft positivism). 
 73. Simma & Paulus, supra note 27, at 307. 
 74. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT‘L L. 413, 
413 (1983) (quoting P. GUGGENHEIM, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (2d ed. 1967)). 
 75. Simma & Paulus, supra note 27, at 304.  
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legal philosophy, international law positivists accept, as do their 
jurisprudence counterparts, what Brian Leiter has termed the Separation 
Thesis (what law is and what law ought to be are separate questions), and 
the Social Thesis (what counts as law is fundamentally a question of social 
fact).
76
 
Where ―classical‖ and ―modern‖ positivists part company is in their 
criteria for validity of international laws. Simma and Paulus explain that 
―[c]lassic positivism demands rigorous tests for legal validity. Extralegal 
arguments, e.g., arguments that have no textual, systemic, or historical 
basis, are deemed irrelevant to legal analysis; there is only hard law, no 
soft law.‖77 Their insistence on a precise rule of recognition could 
necessitate, or at least explain, classical international law positivists‘ 
rejection of normative or policy criteria for legal validity. Ambiguities in 
normative criteria would render the rule of recognition uncertain and 
undermine the concept of law as social fact. In general jurisprudence, this 
is Dworkin‘s Conventionality Thesis.78 Brigitte Stern additionally echoes 
Raz‘s argument that law‘s distinctive authority normatively must be 
internally defined without reference to external values and policies.
79
 
In comparison, modern international law positivists seem more like soft 
positivists. They acknowledge that ―soft law‖ may be a sort of law even 
though their criteria for validity is more open-textured.
80
 They also appear 
to accept the introduction of policy as long as it is prescribed as a relevant 
consideration by a law. Simma and Paulus state that in circumstances 
where there does not appear to be only one correct legal answer, the 
positivist may derive a legal answer by injecting his ―ethical standpoint,‖ 
for instance, through the application of ―general principles of law,‖ or 
insofar as ―global values . . . find sufficient expression in legal form.‖81  
 
 
 76. Leiter, supra note 72, at 356–59. 
 77. Simma & Paulus, supra note 27, at 304.  
 78. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 114–50; see also Coleman, supra note 72, at 99, 102 (noting that 
Dworkin‘s reason for excluding moral criteria is that such criteria are uncertain and undermine law‘s 
conventionality and that Dworkin ―takes exclusive positivism to be the best and, indeed, only coherent 
version of legal positivism: a coherent but mistaken jurisprudence.‖). 
 79. Brigitte Stern, Custom at the Heart of International Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 89, 
93–94 (2001) (refusing to ―refer to an extra-legal element justifying the passage from fact into law in 
the customary phenomenon as an approach which is foreign to a veritable legal science‖ and 
concluding that ―law is nothing but a particular factual modality, a legal order that can define itself as a 
factual order considered as law, without anything needing to be added to this definition.‖).  
 80. Simma & Paulus, supra note 27, at 306. 
 81. Id. at 316; see Wiessner & Willard, supra note 31; see also HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 
supra note 25, at 304; JOHNSTON, supra note 23 (citing the soft positivist Hart in support of their 
conception of classical positivism). 
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The perceived conflict between the New Haven conception of law and 
positivists regarding whether policy is a criterion for legal validity is not 
always a true conflict. Because soft positivists and ―modern‖ international 
law positivists accept that legal validity could turn on more than just social 
facts, the references of the New Haven School to policy in determining 
appropriate laws is often compatible with their conception of law.  
Hard positivists and ―classical‖ international law positivists could, and 
indeed must, criticize the New Haven conception of law as wrongly 
incorporating policy into the criteria for legal validity. Raz is thoroughly 
rigorous in arguing that law which is contingent on morality (or, in the 
related New Haven vernacular, policy) does not have unique legal 
authority. Nonetheless, there may be some doubt as to whether law that 
turns on policy could be both normatively and legally authoritative. But 
that is a longer debate for another essay.  
My response here is narrower. Hard positivism may not sit comfortably 
with international law for at least two other reasons.  
The first reason turns on the semantic usage of the term. The author is 
not committed to this argument for reasons that will become apparent in 
Part IV of this Article. Nonetheless, he will make it for those who are 
committed to the value of semantics. The term ―international law‖ in its 
ordinary semantic usage among international law professionals is often 
applied to determine the legality of conduct at least in part by normative, 
moral, or policy criteria. For example, customary international law and 
countless bilateral investment treaties often require host states to accord 
foreign investments ―fair and equitable treatment.‖ Numerous arbitral 
awards have confirmed that this standard includes normative criteria such 
as ―legitimate investor expectations,‖ and policy criteria, such as whether, 
in fact-specific contexts, the conduct of the host state promotes business 
stability and foreign investments.
82
 A U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development report states that the ―meaning [of the fair and equitable 
standard] has not been precisely defined.‖83 Under the hard positivist 
conception of law, the fair and equitable treatment standard could not be 
law, because the reference to policy is inherently controversial, so it 
undermines clarity in the law and the Conventionality Thesis. Yet, 
international lawyers, scholars, and arbitrators all regard the fair and 
 
 
 82. See Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 FORDHAM 
INT‘L L.J. 1014, 1031–37 (2007) (discussing the fair and equitable treatment standard). 
 83. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV. (UNCTAD), BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES IN THE MID-1990S, at 53, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, U.N. Sales No. E.98.II.D.8 
(1998).  
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equitable treatment standard as law. Put another way, the term 
―international law‖ includes, as a matter of common usage, imprecise legal 
rules and standards that contain policy and normative content as essential 
components. To the extent that conceptual jurisprudence is meant to 
explain international law as the term is ordinarily used, the inclusion of 
laws with ambiguous normative and policy criteria within the term 
―international law‖ poses difficulties for the hard positivist‘s account of 
international law. 
There is a second related, but distinct, reason for doubting the hard 
positivist conception of law as applied to international law. If a purpose of 
conceptual jurisprudence is to explain the phenomenon of law and how it 
makes a practical difference ―in the structure and content of deliberation 
and action,‖84 then a conception of law must account for laws that can and 
do affect how relevant actors think and behave. Returning to the example 
of the fair and equitable treatment standard, it is beyond doubt that host 
states and investors regard the fair and equitable treatment standard as 
functioning as law. They have spent millions of dollars in legal fees 
disputing whether the standard was breached in investment disputes, and 
host states have honored awards finding breaches of the standard. Because 
inherently ambiguous and normative international legal rules have affected 
behavior and decision-making in profound ways, it behooves jurists to 
conceive of law in a way that accounts for such rules. 
The soft positivist and New Haven conceptions of law are both 
amenable to policy as a constitutive element of law. However, they may 
part ways over the manner in and extent to which policy is incorporated. 
While it is conceptually possible for the rule of recognition to refer to 
normative or policy criteria for validity, soft positivists may charge that 
the New Haven conception of law wrongly contains policy criteria or 
excessively favors policy criteria.  
Two contrasting examples clarify this point. A modern international 
law positivist might accept renvoi to policy considerations where a legal 
rule explicitly contains policy considerations, such as the rule requiring 
host states to accord foreign investors fair and equitable treatment. If a 
New Haven jurist referred to the policy of promoting foreign investments 
in determining if a host state was fair and equitable, the soft positivist 
would not quarrel with this application of the New Haven conception of 
law.  
 
 
 84. Coleman, supra note 72, at 101 (describing this as the practical difference thesis). 
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In contrast, the modern international law positivist would not accept 
renvoi to policy considerations without reference to a legal rule that 
incorporates normative or policy criteria for legality. Consider articles 2(4) 
and 51 of the U.N. Charter, which prohibit the use of military force except 
against an armed attack. In addressing the question of whether these 
articles prohibit preemptive military force against a putative enemy—
which may acquire the capability to launch a devastating attack in the 
future—a soft positivist would be constrained by the plain and ordinary 
language of the articles in light of the object and purpose of the Charter, as 
required by article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
of 1969.
85
 The soft positivist may also consider subsequent state practices 
on the use of force to interpret articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter, as 
mandated by article 31(3) of the Convention.
86
 But the soft positivist 
would not countenance determining the meaning of articles 2(4) and 51, or 
more broadly, the legality of preemptive force, by appraising policy 
concerns thoroughly divorced from canons of treaty interpretation.  
In contrast, a New Haven jurist would not interpret articles 2(4) and 51 
solely by reference to formal rules of treaty interpretation. She would also 
turn to relevant world policies, such as the protection of human lives, the 
maintenance of world order, and the potential for abuse in unilateral 
assessments of future risk. A soft positivist may well charge that the New 
Haven conception of law incorporates policy in a mistaken manner 
because it did not identify any secondary rule permitting such references 
to policy.  
But even this conflict about the manner and extent to which soft 
positivism and New Haven jurisprudence incorporate policy is a false 
conflict in many international disputes. An intellectual task of the New 
Haven School is the clarification of standpoint. The manner in which one 
discerns international law is guided by one‘s role and standpoint. From 
several of these standpoints, the application of New Haven conception of 
law is practically similar to soft positivism. 
As a judge or arbitrator, the New Haven jurist is concerned about 
reaching a normatively desirable outcome, but, he is also constrained by 
formal secondary rules guiding the interpretation of laws and their 
application to facts to reach judicial decisions.
87
 There are strong policy 
 
 
 85. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf. 
 86. Id. art. 31(3). 
 87. For a detailed discussion of judging from the New Haven perspective, see W. Michael 
Reisman, A Judge’s Judge: Justice Florentino P. Feliciano’s Philosophy of the Judicial Function, in 
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reasons for this practice. It is good policy to generally follow a method of 
legal reasoning accepted as legitimate by the community, and the 
applicable primary and secondary rules often secure relevant community 
values.
88
 Thus, Reisman has written that when deciding arbitral disputes, 
―identification of the major principle and a pellucid logical exercise would 
appear to be a minimum requirement.‖89 This reliance on secondary rules 
to derive applicable laws and their logical application to relevant facts is 
aligned with positivism,
90
 even if the New Haven School and positivists 
discharge their respective judging duties in this manner for different 
reasons.  
However, in other circumstances where applying prior judicial 
decisions to novel circumstances would lead to manifestly absurd results, 
―an adaptation or even an innovation in policy‖ is required. Here, ―a 
purported exercise in logical derivation, far from explaining what is being 
done, can only conceal what is being done.‖91 This rejection of the 
apparently applicable secondary rules to determine laws and legal 
outcomes may seem to depart from positivism, and may provoke claims 
that the New Haven conception of law overly infuses law with policy.  
Dworkin takes roughly the same position as the New Haven School on 
this issue. Dworkin explains that Conventionalism does permit a court to 
depart from binding precedent where the prior decision was ―especially 
immoral,‖ such as where the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. 
Board of Education departed from Plessy v. Ferguson, which had held that 
racial segregation did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United 
States Constitution.
92
 Conventionalists would insist that in such a case, 
―the Court should have made plain to the public the exceptional nature of 
its decision, that it should have admitted it was changing the law for 
nonlegal reasons.‖93 This is similar to Reisman‘s suggestion that where 
 
 
FELICIANO, supra note 58, at 3–10. 
 88. See id. at 7–10. Reisman has explained his decisions in accord with these two policies. See, 
e.g., Dispute Concerning Access to Information under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention (Ir. v. 
U.K.), Final Award (Perm. Ct. of Arb. 2003) at 61, http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/OSPAR%20 
Award.pdf (Decl. of W. Michael Reisman) (proposing ―plain reading of [a treaty provision because it] 
appears to both reflect its objects and purposes and to produce a reasonable and economic means for 
implementing [the obligations in the provision].‖). 
 89. W. Michael Reisman & Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez, How Well Are Investment Awards 
Reasoned?, in THE REASONS REQUIREMENT 1, supra note 58, at 30.  
 90. See, e.g., Dispute Concerning Access to Information under Article 9 of the OSPAR 
Convention, supra note 88. 
 91. W. Michael Reisman & Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez, How Well Are Investment Awards 
Reasoned?, in THE REASONS REQUIREMENT 1, supra note 58, at 30. 
 92. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 93. See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 119.  
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prior decisions would lead to grossly suboptimal outcomes in 
contemporary contexts, a judicial decision to reach a different outcome is 
permissible but should be explained in policy terms rather than in 
seemingly logical extensions of prior decisions. 
From a scholarly standpoint, the New Haven School and positivism 
may part ways. As a scholar, the New Haven jurist is relatively unfettered 
by judicial constraints. The scholar may imagine alternative visions of law 
that better promote relevant policies and social goals, and recommend to 
decision-makers methods to achieve those visions.
94
  
In order to imagine alternate configurations of world order that better 
promote community values, the New Haven School conceives of law as an 
authoritative and controlling process of decision-making to address 
problems and to secure maximum human dignity. So conceived, laws that 
do not secure compliance, or which are not accompanied by expectations 
of compliance by the world community to which they are addressed, do 
not adequately describe the relevant legal system. Conversely, norms, 
customs, or practices that lack formal legal pedigree, but which are either 
accompanied by expectations of compliance by the world community or 
which in fact secure compliance, may be studied as part of the legal 
system.  
In contrast, positivism conceives of law as a system of rules, in which 
their legality turns on their formal legal pedigree even if—as is the case in 
international law—this pedigree is often unaccompanied by expectations 
of compliance. From the scholar‘s standpoint, these two conceptions of 
law appear to be conceptually incompatible.  
B. Pre-concept Commitments  
Even though soft positivism and New Haven jurisprudence may be in 
conflict as regards the manner and extent that policy is incorporated into 
law, this conflict is not really a meaningful conceptual disagreement. This 
is because the two concepts are respectively predicated upon different pre-
concept commitments. Pre-concept commitments are normative choices 
that must be made to develop or describe a conception. These 
commitments or choices include the function of inquiry, the ideal type to 
observe, and the value of semantics. If two parties disagree on any one of 
these pre-concept commitments, their disagreements about 
 
 
 94. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 2, at 38. 
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conceptualizations of their respective objects under inquiry may be 
meaningless.  
A thought experiment illustrates these points. Suppose that the 
conception of a table is the subject of philosophical inquiry. Philosopher A 
is interested in putting forth the best interpretation of a table to enable 
carpenters to build dining tables, whereas Philosopher B is interested in 
describing criteria for a table as it exists in its various forms. A‘s 
conception of a table may well specify that tables must be large enough to 
seat at least two persons and strong enough to bear the weight of china and 
silverware. B‘s conception of a table may specify that a table simply needs 
to be a piece of furniture in which a flat surface is elevated about four feet 
from the ground by one or more vertical legs. It is not possible for A and B 
to meaningfully disagree on their concepts of a table because their 
function of inquiries are different. They may certainly debate their 
preferred purposes of philosophizing, but this is not a conceptual debate. 
Philosopher C enters into a debate with B. B‘s ideal type of a table is 
extrapolated from the salient characteristics common among tables in his 
home. C, however, comes from a different culture in which people sit 
cross-legged on the floor and designate as a table what others might 
ordinarily call a tray. C‘s conception of a table will be radically different 
than B‘s conception because their ideal types, or the representative data 
they observed to conceptualize, are different. Again, to assert that B and C 
disagree about the conception of a table is not meaningful, because they 
are simply speaking about different things. 
C leaves in a huff, and in comes D. D is a scientist with aesthetic 
pretensions. He has invented a stable platform that is suspended in the air 
by magnetic fields created by a machine installed beneath floorboards. B, 
who is committed to the semantic usage of the word ―table‖ insists that the 
conception of a table cannot be extrapolated from the floating platform 
because no one in the community would use the word ―table‖ in that way. 
D, however, does not share the same commitment to semantic usage of 
words. In his view, what matters more is whether the platform serves the 
same function as a table. Because it is a stable flat surface parallel to the 
ground on which a person could eat, read, and write, the conception of a 
table must include his platform. 
The point here about disagreements over commitments to the value of 
semantics is different from Dworkin‘s semantic sting argument. Dworkin 
argued that philosophers must agree on roughly the same criteria for a 
conception denoted by a word before they can have a meaningful 
disagreement on that conception. So, according to Dworkin, if you do not 
count his copy of Moby Dick as a book because, in your view, novels are 
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not books, ―any agreement is bound to be senseless‖ because you and 
Dworkin are using the word ―book‖ in completely different ways.95 Raz 
disagrees with Dworkin. In Raz‘s view, in the ordinary course of human 
interaction, you would not insist that Moby Dick is not a book and you 
would apologize for your mistake.
96
 According to Raz, ―[c]riterial 
explanations of concepts are consistent with the fact that people who use 
the rules setting out these criteria may make mistakes about which criteria 
are set by the rules.‖97  
Although Raz is correct that people can make mistakes about semantic 
criteria without invalidating criterial explanations, he seems to miss 
Dworkin‘s point. If a person is committed to different semantic criteria, 
then it is impossible to engage in a meaningful disagreement with him 
about the conception denoted by the word being used. Take for example, 
the word ―consideration.‖ A person committed to the semantics of its 
ordinary usage may say the conception of consideration entails 
deliberately thinking about an idea. A lawyer, who does not share those 
semantics, but is committed to the specialized semantics of his profession, 
asserts that the concept of consideration is a bargained-for exchange of 
something of legal value. The lay person and the lawyer may disagree 
about their concepts of consideration, but they are speaking past each 
other. 
In any event, the author‘s point about the value of semantics does not 
stand or fall on whether Dworkin or Raz is correct, because he makes a 
slightly different point. The author‘s point is that for there to be 
meaningful conceptual disagreement, the disagreeing parties must share 
roughly the same pre-concept commitment to the value of semantics in 
conceptualizing. Without this commitment, a philosopher may determine a 
conception by the functions ascribed to it by the community, rather than 
by its ordinary semantic meaning of the word representing the conception. 
This conception could be quite different from the conception shackled to 
the semantic usage of the word representing the conception. So, Scientist 
D is not committed to semantics about how an object appears, but instead 
focuses on how an object functions, so he designates his platform as a 
table. B, who is committed to semantics, does not believe the word table 
and its associated conception includes platforms. Yet D and B cannot have 
 
 
 95. See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 45.  
 96. Joseph Raz, Two Views on the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison, in 
HART‘S POSTSCRIPT 1, supra note 29, at 17 (making the point with reference to a disagreement about 
tables and sideboards). 
 97. Id. at 19. 
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a meaningful conceptual disagreement. They could certainly have a 
meaningful disagreement about semantic commitments, but this would be 
anterior to conceptual debate.  
We can now apply our discussion about pre-concept commitments to 
the apparent conceptual incompatibility between the New Haven School 
and positivists. In the author‘s view, it is difficult for New Haven jurists 
and positivists to engage each other about conceptual differences because 
they disagree about all three pre-concept commitments.
98
  
As regards the function of jurisprudence, the New Haven conception of 
law seeks to provide guidance to decision-makers about what to do to 
authoritatively secure maximum human dignity. International law 
positivists adopt as key functions of jurisprudence describing law as 
distinct from policy, ethics, or morality, and providing the best 
explanatory or descriptive account of law as a system of legal rules.
99
 Not 
surprisingly, the New Haven School takes as its starting point law as the 
process of decision-making, whereas positivists take as their starting point 
law as a body of rules.
100
  
As regards the ideal type of law, because the New Haven School is 
committed to offering practical guidance to decision-makers, it selects as 
its ideal type the entire global decision-making process in which power 
and authority are diffused rather than concentrated in elite law-makers; in 
which claims and norms may be, to varying degrees, authoritatively 
controlling; and in which formal legal rules may not tell the whole story 
about the actions and deliberations of relevant actors.
101
 In contrast, 
international law positivists designate as their ideal type the body of 
international legal rules concerning international relations that are legally 
validated by reference to limited sources specified through an international 
rule of recognition. With such different ideal types, it is almost 
 
 
 98. See Coleman, supra note 72, at 106 (―A theory of law is a contestable conception of law, 
reflecting, as it must, an account of law‘s function or purpose. Disputes between or among conflicting 
legal theories are ultimately normative disputes, resolvable by substantive moral and political 
argument.‖). 
 99. In the extreme, methodological positivism ―maintain[s] that legal theory is a purely 
descriptive, non-normative enterprise that sets out, in the manner of ordinary science, to tell us what 
one particular corner of the whole we inhabit looks like.‖ Stephen R. Perry, The Varieties of Legal 
Positivism, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 361, 361 (1996). 
 100. See Liam Murphy, The Political Question of the Concept of Law, in HART‘S POSTSCRIPT 371, 
supra note 29, at 373 (noting that Hart ―takes for granted that law should be conceived of in a 
positivist manner, and then proceeds to describe the complex structure of law, so understood.‖). 
 101. See W. Michael Reisman, McDougal’s Jurisprudence: Utility, Influence, Controversy, supra 
note 27, at 274. 
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unavoidable that the New Haven School and positivists will identify 
different salient characteristics of their respective conceptions of law.
102
  
As regards the value of semantics, it follows from the New Haven 
School‘s commitment to offering functional guidance that it draws into its 
scope of inquiry factors that affect international conduct, even if those 
factors would not in ordinary usage be termed as law. Reisman has 
explained that ―arrangements and processes . . . may not have been 
assigned the sobriquet, ‗international law,‘ by the people who fashioned 
them; yet from the perspective of the disengaged observer, it will be 
apparent that these processes and arrangements functioned as the struts of 
world or regional order in specific contexts.‖103 This rejection of 
descriptive semantics in favor of functional criteria is an anathema to 
positivists, who are committed to describing those phenomena that 
ordinarily would fall within the normal usage of the word ―law.‖104 
These normative disagreements as to the purpose of jurisprudence, the 
ideal type of international law, and the relevance of semantics cannot be 
properly addressed at the conceptual level. The resulting differences 
between the New Haven School and positivists‘ respective concepts of law 
are accordingly not really conceptual disagreements. They are, more 
fundamentally, normative disagreements about pre-concept 
commitments.
105
  
 
 
 102. Cf. Murphy, supra note 100, at 409 (noting that underlying Dworkin‘s and Hart‘s accounts of 
law ―is a fundamental disagreement about the politically most desirable way to conceive of law‘s 
domain.‖). 
 103. W. Michael Reisman, Preface to JOHNSTON, supra note 23, at vii. See generally W. 
MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS (1999). 
 104. Stavropoulos, in HART‘S POSTSCRIPT 59, supra note 1, at 70 (―It seems natural to suppose 
that conceptual analysis aims at articulating the existing, common understanding of the terms whose 
extension constitutes the field of inquiry.‖) (emphasis in original). 
 105. See Leiter, in HART‘S POSTSCRIPT 355, supra note 29, at 367 (noting the view that 
―[c]onceptual analysis, by itself, gives us no reason to prefer one concept to the other; only a further, 
normative argument can do that . . . .‖). Leiter disagrees with this view, arguing that hard positivism 
provides a concept of law that ―figures in the most fruitful a posteriori research programmes, i.e. the 
ones that give us the best going account of how the world works.‖ Id. at 369. For the reasons set forth 
in Part IV, infra, Leiter‘s view does not apply to international law, where policy-oriented jurisprudence 
offers a stronger explanatory account of how contestations among conceptions of law are resolved in 
international conflicts. In subsequent work, the author will test this descriptive claim further and also 
examine whether policy-oriented jurisprudence additionally offers the normatively most attractive 
account of how the world ought to work even in problems with competing conceptions of international 
law. See TAI-HENG CHENG, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS COMMITMENT (forthcoming 2011). 
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IV. ADDRESSING CONFLICTS 
This Article has discussed why differences between the policy-oriented 
and positivist conceptions of international law are not meaningful 
conceptual disputes. The meaningful disagreements are over pre-concept 
commitments that are not of a conceptual nature, but of a normative 
nature. 
It may be possible to go some way to bridge the apparent normative 
gulf by recognizing the respective pre-concept commitments of the New 
Haven School and positivists. It might even be possible to have a 
meaningful conversation about law once jurists and scholars accept that 
the word ―law‖ can denote two often non-mutually exclusive conceptions, 
which I shall call Law1 and Law2.
106
 Law1 refers to the positivist 
conception of law, a body of legal rules derived from secondary rules 
governing legal pedigree. Some scholars have referred to this as a ―legal 
regime,‖107 or a ―theory of law.‖108 Law2 refers to the New Haven 
conception of law, the process of authoritative and controlling decision-
making. Some scholars have variously referred to this as a ―legal order,‖109 
a ―theory about law,‖110 or ―world order.‖111 
With this distinction, it is possible for a positivist to assert that there is 
a Law1 rule against preemptive military force without claiming that this 
rule is also Law2, if the Law1 rule—slavishly applied to every situation—
may lead to a suboptimal policy outcome for the world community. 
Conversely, a New Haven jurist may assert that Law2 permits preemptive 
military force in certain contexts in which such force would promote 
world order and maximize human well-being, broadly speaking, while 
accepting that a Law1 rule against preemptive force exists on the books 
and entails a strong, albeit not necessarily overwhelming, expectation of 
compliance.  
 
 
 106. Janet Halley made a similar semantic move in explaining various feminist theories. JANET 
HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS 23–25 (2006).  
 107. Symposium, Comparative Visions of Global Public Order, 46 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 387, 387–88 
(2005) (distinguishing between legal regimes and legal orders). 
 108. JOHNSTON, supra note 23, at 113. 
 109. See Symposium, supra note 107, at 387. 
 110. See Reisman, Theory About Law, supra note 33, at 935; JOHNSTON, supra note 23, at 113; 
see also Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, Theories about 
International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT‘L L. 188 (1968). 
 111. W. Michael Reisman‘s international law course at Yale Law School is titled ―Public Order of 
the World Community: A Contemporary International Law,‖ http://www.law.yale.edu/news/ 
WReisman.htm. Douglas Johnston‘s final opus is titled The Historical Foundations of World Order, 
rather than The Historical Foundations of International Law. JOHNSTON, supra note 23. 
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The distinction between Law1 and Law2 can be useful to legal advisors 
in foreign ministries as well. A legal advisor with a policy bent may 
counsel her foreign minister that Law1 prohibits preemptive force, but 
because the threat of destruction from a particular putative enemy seeking 
nuclear weapons is so great, her government should consider military 
preemption from a Law2 perspective, even at the cost of flouting the Law1 
rule. Alternatively, a legal advisor with a strict positivist orientation may 
decide to advise his foreign minister of the Law1 rule against preemptive 
force, and explicitly leave considerations of Law2 to other policy advisors. 
Differentiating between Law1 and Law2 also helps to explain how a 
New Haven jurist performing a judicial function can appraise a dispute 
before him under Law2, but nonetheless recognize that he is bound in his 
role to decide the dispute in accordance with Law1 and ultimately follow 
Law1. It is also possible for a positivist sitting as a judge to recognize that 
the applicable Law1 rules would lead to such a terrible outcome in Law2 
terms that it would unacceptably shock the conscience, and as a result to 
issue a decision that departs from Law1 and explains its reasons using 
Law2, as Dworkin and Reisman both recommend.
112
 
The two incidents that provided factual launching pads for this Article 
illustrate the utility and limits of the semantic move described above. The 
question of whether article 51 of the United Nations Charter provided a 
legal basis for Israel‘s construction of a wall enclosing the occupied 
Palestinian territory is, in some senses, an easier case.
113
 There was a 
normative gap between the majority‘s Law1 positivist interpretation and of 
article 51 and the Nicaragua case and Judge Higgin‘s Law2 policy-
oriented conception of the law of self-defense. Under Law1, article 51 
does not apply to Israel because the occupied territories are not a state, and 
the Nicaragua case held that article 51 only applies to self-defense against 
a state. Under Law2, law of self-defense might permit Israel‘s action to 
avoid the imbalance that would result if the occupied territories were 
treated as a state to be invited to the International Court of Justice 
proceedings and benefit from humanitarian law but were insufficiently an 
international entity subject to the regulation of armed attacks under article 
51.  
This normative conflict between Law1 and Law2 was partly avoided 
because Judge Higgins found other Law1 reasons to reject the application 
of article 51. In her view, article 51 would not apply to Israel‘s actions 
 
 
 112. See supra Part III. 
 113. See supra Part I. 
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even if article 51 extended to armed attacks by non-state actors because 
the construction of a wall was not self-defense within the meaning of the 
provision.
114
 She also questioned whether Israel‘s actions met the 
thresholds of necessity and proportionality required for any legitimate 
exercise of self-defense.
115
 In this fashion, Judge Higgins was also able to 
avoid a formal conflict between Law1 and Law2 by locating other 
independent Law1 grounds for rejecting the argument that article 51 
applied to Israel.
116
  
The conflict between Law1 and Law2 was also, at least formally, 
resolved by the hierarchy of conceptions of law institutionalized within the 
International Court of Justice. In the adjudicative context, tribunals often 
have a strong institutional norm to favor Law1 over Law2. This preference 
might, in extreme cases of injustice that would result from Law1, be 
overcome. However, the Wall Opinion was not an extreme case in which 
Law1 produced an abhorrent outcome. Accordingly, although Judge 
Higgins expressed a preference for Law2, she accepted Law1 as it 
stands.
117
  
At another level, which is both normative and practical in nature, there 
remained a true conflict. In many international law settings, including at 
the International Court of Justice, and especially when it gives non-
binding advisory opinions, the institution involved lacks controlling 
authority to prescribe effective forcible sanctions or remedies for illegal 
acts. The formal authority of the institution is limited to stating its view. 
Yet it would be naïve to think that when a legitimate institution states its 
view on law, this exercise does not exert any authority or control on 
international actors. By expressing a view on the applicable law, the 
institution imposes reputational and other informal costs on actors whose 
conduct deviates from that view.
118
 The institution‘s view may also carry 
normative heft that may, to varying degrees, be constitutive of 
international law in future disputes.
119
 In an advisory opinion, when a 
judge and highly qualified publicist proposes a Law2 alternative and states 
her objections to Law1 in Law2 terms, she reduces the normative force 
 
 
 114. Wall Opinion, supra note 14, at 215–16, ¶ 35 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. (finding that building a wall was not a non-forcible measure within article 51 and that it 
may not have been necessary and proportionate). 
 117. Id. at 215, ¶ 33. 
 118. See generally GUZMAN, supra note 27.  
 119. See HIGGINS, supra note 18, at 1 (―International law . . . is a normative system.‖); see also 
Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Beyond Compliance: Why International Law Really Matters, 1 GLOBAL 
POLICY 127 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1551923. 
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and authority of the majority opinion and moderates the reputational cost 
of the opinion on the deviating actor, which in the Wall Opinion was 
Israel. From this perspective, it would be simplistic to conclude that the 
International Court of Justice has a fully controlling and effective 
institutional hierarchy that favors Law1 over Law2.  
More accurately, Law1 may formally prevail over Law2, but in 
normative terms the hierarchy between the two conceptions of law could 
be contested. Ultimately, resolution of the normative conflict between 
Law1 and Law2 may turn on the persuasiveness of judges favoring each 
respective conception of law, and the attractiveness of outcomes 
prescribed by each conception of law in specific disputes. In many 
instances, legal prescriptions will emerge over time and will likely reflect 
some balance between the competing conceptions as they are applied to 
specific international disputes. 
The disagreement about whether the United States acted lawfully in 
invading Iraq illustrates this process of resolving conflicting conceptions 
of law in the absence of an authoritative hierarchy.
120
 The Law1 approach 
of France, China, and Russia—a strict reading of Resolution 1441—would 
characterize the invasion as illegal. The Law2 approach of the United 
States—determining legality in light of the applicable policies, such as the 
control of weapons of mass destruction, and the threat that Iraq posed, 
along with a more liberal reading of Resolution 1441—would permit the 
invasion. Unlike judicial decision-making, in which judges would 
generally defer to Law1 in making dispositive decisions unless Law1 was 
wholly egregious (and even then it is not certain if some judges would 
depart from Law1), in foreign policy decisions there is often no clear legal 
hierarchy between Law1 and Law2.  
It may be tempting to conclude therefore that foreign policy decisions 
are thus driven by sheer power—akin to the critical Law3 approach of the 
United Kingdom in which Law1 is often regarded as indeterminate and 
amenable to being deployed rhetorically to support political goals. Such a 
grim conclusion might be an oversimplification of the interface between 
law and power. Every permanent member of the Security Council felt the 
need to justify their position by reference to legality. Even though the 
appropriate conception of law in the invasion of Iraq may have been an 
open question, and even though Law1 was open to different 
interpretations, the pursuit of legality exerted some controlling authority 
over the actors because it was not open to them to countenance acts that 
 
 
 120. See supra Part I. 
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fell beyond the outer reaches of believable claims to legality. So, for 
instance, even in its fluid state, international law could be said to have 
restrained the United States from invading Iraq prior to its breach of 
Resolution 1441. International law could be said to have been a large 
factor in bringing the permanent members to the negotiating arena of the 
Security Council, which may thereby have limited the range of unilateral 
actions countenanced. At the same time, however, any appraisal of events 
must be realistic. While law slowed the United States down, and probably 
modified its behavior, no conception of law could stop the United States 
once it made its mind up to invade Iraq.  
Whatever the power of the United States to invade Iraq, it was not 
necessarily powerful enough to establish the dominance of Law2 over 
Law1 and Law3. At the present time, whether the world community will 
accept the United State‘s Law2 analysis, and whether the United State‘s 
actions may come to be regarded as lawful under international law, 
remains unclear. The lawful scope of preemptive force in future disputes 
also remains uncertain. Eventually, after international decision-makers 
exchange more claims and counterclaims about which conception of law 
applies and what each of those conceptions prescribe, the international 
community may reach a decision, or at least a temporary equilibrium, 
about the scope of preemptive force. The decision will probably reflect 
some mix of Law1, Law2, and Law3 (and potentially, yet other 
conceptions of international law not considered in this Article).
121
 It will 
also probably reflect the relative normative value of each of the different 
conceptions of law as applied to preemptive force, along with the relative 
power of decision-makers supporting the different conceptions. Further 
investigation will need to be carried out to test and specify in greater detail 
the international process of resolving contests among conceptions of law 
in particular international disputes. 
If this analysis proves correct, then it might demonstrate the ultimate 
utility of policy-oriented jurisprudence. At one level, the policy-oriented 
conception of international law is just one of several important 
conceptions. Formally speaking, no conception is hierarchically superior 
to any other. Whether or not a conception of international law applies to an 
international problem may turn on its normative appeal, its predictive 
power, and its explanatory value. At another level, in the absence of an 
authoritative hierarchy of conceptions, the process through which 
 
 
 121. See TAI-HENG CHENG, WHEN INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS (forthcoming 2011) (on file 
with author) (surveying conceptions of international law in chapter two). 
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decision-makers promote their different conceptions of law and reach 
outcomes is exactly the process described and appraised by policy-
oriented jurisprudence. Ironically, although policy-oriented jurisprudence 
may not be the only conception of law applicable to international 
problems, it may be the best conception of law to address conflicts among 
conceptions when they occur.  
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